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The severe inequities that characterize American metropolitan
systems of education, housing and employment are closely related
to the geographic concentration of low-income families in inner
city neighborhoods.1 A high degree of racial isolation also
frequently accompanies poverty concentration in urban schools2
and neighborhoods.' This physical separation and isolation of poor
minority families deprives children of access to economic opportu-
nity and perpetuates disadvantage across generations.4
* The author is an attorney with the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union
Foundation ("CCLUF"), where he has been active in fair housing advocacy and
litigation. He is currently co-counsel, with attorneys at New Haven Legal
Assistance and the CCLUF, in a civil rights case pending against the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). Christian Community
Action v. Kemp, No. 3:91CV00296 (D. Conn. filed June 3, 1991). The author
is grateful for the insights of Michael Hanley, Thomas Henderson and Glenn
Falk.
See DOUGLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 115-47 (1993).
2 GARY ORFIELD, NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASS'N, THE GROWTH OF
SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF SEPARATION
AND POVERTY SINCE 1968 21-22 (1993).
' MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 1, at 115-47.
4 See Florence Wagman Roisman & Hilary Botein, Housing Mobility and
Life Opportunities, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 335, 336-38 (1993); MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 1, at 148-85; Gary Orfield, Urban Schooling and the
Perpetuation of Job Inequality in Metropolitan Chicago, in URBAN LABOR
MARKETS AND JOB OPPORTUNITY (George E. Peterson and Wayne Vroman eds.,
1992); see also ALEXANDER POLIKOFF, CENTER FOR HOUSING POLICY, HOUSING
POLICY AND URBAN POVERTY (1994). Segregation in housing and schools is
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After more than a decade of official neglect,5 regional housing
desegregation has reemerged as an urgent theme of public policy.
For example, early in his term, Henry Cisneros, Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"), repeatedly decried "the
extreme spatial segregation or separations in American life by
income, class and race."6 Even before the Clinton administration
took office, powerful new social science findings on the benefits of
integration for participants in Chicago's Gautreaux housing
mobility program7 had persuaded Congress to begin replicating the
often accompanied by disparities in educational resources, unequal housing and
neighborhood conditions, inadequate levels of municipal services and general
disinvestment in central city neighborhoods. See generally JONATHAN KOZOL,
SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1991); Elizabeth K.
Julian & Michael M. Daniel, Separate and Unequal: The Root and Branch of
Public Housing Segregation, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 666 (1989); MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 1; see also infra note 12 (historical role of government in
fostering housing segregation).
5 See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 3, 121 (1993); MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 1, at 1-16.
6 Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (Apr. 28, 1993) (statement of Henry Cisneros, Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development). In his testimony, Secretary Cisneros
warned that "[u]nless we can deconcentrate the populations of our poorest...
[u]nless we can make it possible for people to have greater choice and move to
suburban areas ... we will not succeed.'Id at 7-8. HUD's new emphasis on
regional housing opportunities is also reflected in an early policy report, Creating
Communities of Opportunity: Priorities of U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development(1993), and in HUD's 1994 proposals to Congress, HUD FY
1995 BUDGET: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1994) [hereinafter FY 1995 BUDGET].
The new HUD administration has also emphasized the need to enhance housing
conditions in existing HUD developments. Id. at 5-8, 20-21.
7 The Gautreaux housing program arose out of a 1966 lawsuit against HUD
and the Chicago Housing Authority, which resulted in a finding of intentional
racial segregation in Chicago public housing, and a regional desegregation
remedy that was eventually upheld by the Supreme Court. Hills v. Gautreaux,
425 U.S. 284, 291 (1976); see discussion infra note 78. An important aspect of
the Gautreaux remedy was the use of federal § 8 rental certificates, see infra
note 37 and accompanying text, earmarked for use outside of areas of minority
concentration, including the suburbs. See Alexander Polikoff, Gautreaux and
Institutional Litigation, 64 Cli.-KENT L. REV. 451 (1988). The program has
served about 5,000 families since 1976 (roughly one-half of whom have moved
to suburban towns) and has now been extensively analyzed by social scientists.
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program in additional cities.8 Recently, the Clinton administration
issued an ambitious new executive order on fair housing9 that will
seek to implement the duty, first enunciated in the Fair Housing
Act of 1968,10 to "affirmatively further" fair housing in all federal
housing programs."
The most widely distributed summary of the Gautreaux research, describing both
employment and education benefits for former public housing residents who
participated in the suburban rental certificate program was published in 1991,
shortly before the Moving to Opportunity program was adopted. See James E.
Rosenbaum, Black Pioneers-Do Their Moves to the Suburbs Increase Economic
Opportunityfor Mothers and Children?, 2 HouSING POL'Y DEBATE 1179 (1991).
See generally Roisman & Botein, supra note 4, at 336-37, for a useful summary
of the Gautreaux research.
' The "Moving to Opportunity Demonstration Program" provides new § 8
rental certificates and funding for regional housing counselling for participating
families seeking suburban apartments. The program was created by § 152 of the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106
Stat. 3762 (1992). Program guidelines are set out at 58 Fed. Reg. 43,458 (1993).
The cities selected for the Moving to Opportunity Demonstration include
Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York. The Moving to
Opportunity program may soon be supplemented by the $149 million "Choice in
Residency" program, included in President Bill Clinton's 1995 proposed budget
for HJD, which, if fully funded, could provide housing mobility counselling for
up to 300,000 additional families. See HUD FY 1995 BUDGET, supra note 6, at
17.
9 Exec. Order No. 12892, 59 Fed. Reg. 2939 (1994), entitled Leadership and
Coordination of Fair Housing in Federal Programs. The executive order created
a "President's Fair Housing Council" and required, inter alia, promulgation of
regulations to "describethe responsibilities and obligations" of executive agencies
and program participants to affirmatively further fair housing. Id. at § 4-40 1. In
an accompanying memorandum dated January 17, 1994, President Clinton
directed the Fair Housing Council to develop a demonstration program that "will
break down jurisdictional barriers in housing opportunities, and will promote the
use of subsidies that diminish residential segregation.. . ." 59 Fed. Reg. 8513,
8514 (1994); see infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
10 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
"' All executive departments and agencies are required to "administer their
programs and activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner
affirmatively to further the purposes" of the Fair Housing Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3608(e)(5) (1988). This duty extends, in theory, to local housing authorities
administering HUD programs. See Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 484
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New efforts to promote housing desegregation, however, will
face serious obstacles that are built into the current, locally based
system of low-income housing administration. This system of local
government control over assisted housing decisions has facilitated
housing segregation12 and is a component of the overall "jurisdic-
tional fragmentation" that characterizes many American metropoli-
tan areas.' 3 Examples at the state level include the widespread
delegation of land use regulation to municipalities, 4 state laws
barring housing agencies from unilaterally placing public or assisted
housing outside their geographic areas 5 and laws specifically
requiring permission of the local governing body for any assisted
housing development.' 6 At the federal level, HUD has routinely
F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973). For a useful discussion of cases decided under this
section, see ROBERT SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND
LITIGATION ch. 21 (1993).
12 The historical role of federal government in creating and perpetuating
segregated housing patterns has been amply described. See, e.g., Citizens
Comm'n on Civil Rights, The Federal Government and Equal Housing
Opportunity: A Continuing Failure, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING
(1986); JAMES A. KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN AMERICA (1979); MASSEY &
DENTON, supra note 1, at 42-59. Yale Rabin has also described the role of local
government in Roots of Segregation in the Eighties: The Role of Local
Government Actions, in DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS: CHANGING PATTERNS OF
RACIAL SEGREGATION (Gary A. Tobin ed., 1987). While these accounts focus
primarily on affirmative government actions that have promoted segregation, they
also implicitly provide support for a central thesis of this Article-that the
localized system of low-income housing administration is itself a strong
contributing factor to segregation. See also RUSK, supra note 5, at 33-35.
13 See Peter D. Salins, Metropolitan Areas: Cities, Suburbs, and the Ties
That Bind, in INTERWOVEN DESTINIES (Henry Cisneros ed., 1993); see also
RUSK, supra note 5.
" See generally Florence Wagman Roisman & Philip Tegeler, Improving
and Expanding Housing Opportunities for Poor People of Color: Recent
Developments in Federal and State Courts, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 312, 343
(1990); Salins, supra note 13, at 159-60.
"5 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-39 (1993); N.Y. PUB. Hous. LAW § 31
(McKinney 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-18-41 (Bums 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 310, para. 10/3, 17(b), 30 (Smith-Hurd 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 99.080,
99.320 (Vernon 1989).
16 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-120 (1993); N.Y. PUB. HOUS. LAW
§ 150 (McKinney 1989). The exclusionary potential implicit in such statutes is
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deferred to such local restrictions, 7 has added its own local
notification and approval requirements for public housing develop-
ment 8 and has routinely approved or tolerated local residency
preferences19 and other exclusionary practices.20 Both federal and
state laws encourage the proliferation of multiple housing agencies,
even within the same housing market.2'
The problems caused by local administration are exacerbated by
the "voluntary" character of local housing responsibility. With the
possible exception of New Jersey,22 low-income housing is not yet
viewed as a routine municipal responsibility.23 Instead, low-
income housing is treated legally as a voluntary, local, civic
exemplified by cases like Housing Authority of the Town of East Hartford v.
Papandrea, 610 A.2d 637 (Conn. 1992), where a local PHA sought to bar the
state housing agency from administering portable rental certificates in the Public
Housing Agency's ("PHA's") town.
17 For example, in the administration of the § 8 rental certificate program,
HUD has required local PHAs to define the area in which they are "not legally
barred" from operating and to limit use of certificates to that area. See 24 C.F.R.
§ 882.103 (1993).
s 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437c(e), 1439(a-d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See discussion
infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(a)(4) (1993) (§ 8); see discussion infra
notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 121b, § 3 (West 1989) ("There is
hereby created, in each city and town in the commonwealth, a public body...
known as the 'Housing authority'.. .") (creation subject to determination of
need); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-40 (1993).
22 New Jersey may be unique in its adoption of mandatory inclusionary
zoning laws that require (with exceptions) construction of a percentage of low-
income housing in some communities. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27D-301-329
(West 1986 & Supp. 1994) (New Jersey Fair Housing Act). The New Jersey
statute was adopted in response to the successful Mount Laurel litigation. See
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d
390 (N.J. 1983) (Mount Laurel II). California also has a statutory scheme that
commits local governments to build affordable housing in certain areas. See CAL.
Gov'T CODE §§ 65580-65589.8, 65590 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994).
23 See, e.g., United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1218-19
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988); JAMES A. KUSHNER, FAIR
HoUSING § 7.09 (1993).
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endeavor. 24 Consequently, housing desegregation claims have
usually been successful only in local jurisdictions that have already
decided to build publicly assisted housing.25 Thus, when segregat-
ed public housing is challenged, it is generally only public hous-
ing-within the jurisdiction where the housing is located-that will
be integrated. 26 Also, under this voluntary system, federal housing
funds are allocated only to local geographic areas that explicitly
request assistance. Except for choosing among such requests, HUD
generally has made no independent needs-based assessments of
24 As one example, even the decision of whether to create a local housing
agency to promote low-income housing is often statutorily delegated to the local
level. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-40 (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch.
121 b, § 3 (West 1989) (creation of housing authority subject to local determina-
tion of need). One significant federal effort to impose federal housing obligations
on local governments, as a condition of funding under the Community
Development Block Grant Program, has often been unenforceable. See, e.g., City
of Hartford v. Town of Glastonbury, 561 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
25 Exclusionary zoning challenges can be an exception to this general
observation when they are brought by a low-income housing developer to
challenge exclusion of a project in a predominantly White community. See, e.g.,
Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.),
aff'dper curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village
of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025
(1978). Although such cases can reasonably be described as desegregation cases,
they rarely include broad affirmative desegregation relief against the
municipality, and usually require only that rezoning be permitted so that the
project may go forward.
26 The classic example of this problem is provided by the Yonkers case,
United States v. Yonkers Board of Education, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988). Because Yonkers had affirmatively sought out
publicly assisted housing for one increasingly segregated comer of the city, its
liability under the U.S. Constitution and the Fair Housing Act was clearly
established, and a sweeping housing remedy order could be imposed-albeit
limited to the boundaries of Yonkers. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.,
635 F. Supp. 1577 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). At the same time, nearby suburbs that had
in the past taken virtually no responsibility for subsidized housing, faced no




where new housing dollars should be spent within segregated
metropolitan regions.27
This systematic delegation of control over publicly assisted
housing to small governmental units forms the underlying legal
structure of housing segregation.2' This Article suggests that if
HUD's ambitious desegregation agenda is to succeed, HUD must
take steps to reverse its policies of deference to local governments
and Public Housing Agencies ("PHAs") 29 on issues that may
affect fair housing.3" The discussion that follows describes the
consequences of deferring to local prerogatives in several existing
programs, and suggests a series of related principles to evaluate the
27 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1439 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 24 C.F.R. pt. 791
(1993).
28 Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) openly declares that
"[i]t is the policy of the United States ... consistent with the objectives of this
chapter, to vest in local public housing agencies the maximum amount of
responsibility in the administration of their housing programs." However, as this
Article suggests, this broad declaration has been superseded by Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, which declares that "[i]t is the policy of the United
States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout
the United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988).
29 "Public Housing Agencies" ("PHAs") are defined to include both local
and statewide entities. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(6) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 24
C.F.R. pt. 791 (1993). In this Article, the term PHA will be used primarily
(unless otherwise noted) to refer to those local city- or town-based entities which
are also commonly referred to under state law as public housing "authorities."
30 This Article proceeds from the assumption that desegregation of
government-assisted housing is a positive goal, and that it can be achieved in a
manner that is consistent with the free housing choice of low-income families.
The term "desegregation" is used specifically to refer to the process of reducing
or eliminating the racial and economic isolation of low-income families in
government-sponsored inner city enclaves. This Article does not address the
debate over the merits of integration generally, see Derrick Bell, Brown and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, in SHADES OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 90 (Derrick Bell ed., 1980) (schools), nor does it
address the relative value of regional desegregation versus equalization of
housing and neighborhood conditions in low-income communities of color, see
John 0. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back
to the Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487 (1993). It is the author's view that
efforts to improve housing and neighborhood conditions in low-income
communities can coexist effectively with regional desegregation efforts.
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likely success of current and future desegregation proposals. 3'
I. LOCAL DISCRETION IN PRACTICE
Broad local discretion in administering federal housing
programs can conflict with efforts to successfully integrate housing.
HUD regulations and policies in the following areas illustrate the
segregative consequences of ceding too much control over federal
housing policy to local government entities: (1) the provision of a
municipal veto over federal public housing through local coopera-
tion agreements; (2) the use of a voluntary housing allocation
system, which can channel new housing funds in a pattern that
enhances segregation; (3) the assigning of admissions functions to
local PHAs; (4) an outmoded site selection policy for publicly
assisted housing, which is based on local levels of racial segrega-
tion; and (5) the use of unnecessarily complicated procedures when
federal rental certificate holders cross town lines to rent apartments.
A. Cooperation Agreements
The cooperation agreement3 2  is a prime example of
3" This Article is primarily concerned with desegregation of government-
assisted housing programs. It should be noted, however, that much of the racial
and economic segregation that dominates American metropolitan areas is a
product of the private housing market and, although strongly influenced by
governmental policies, remains relatively immune from systemic attack.
Proposals to deter discrimination in the private housing market and influence
private residential choices have included enhanced fair housing testing and
enforcement; aggressive affirmative marketing programs; economic incentives to
individual homeowners; and even a federal fair share housing plan tied to local
property tax deductions, to name a few. See John C. Boger, Toward Ending
Residential Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal for the Next Reconstruction, 71
N.C. L. REv. 1573 (1993); Anthony Downs, Policy Directions Concerning
Racial Discrimination in US. Housing Markets, 3 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 685
(1992). Yet, even the proponents of such proposals are skeptical about the
possibility of significantly influencing private residential racial segregation. See,
e.g., Boger, supra, at 1576-80. It may be that the best immediate opportunity for
reducing racial and economic isolation in our society is through the aggressive
desegregation of government housing programs.
3' 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(e).
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congressional deference to local exclusionary policies. The
cooperation agreement provision of the U.S. Housing and
Community Development Act, most recently readopted in 1974, 33
requires local government approval before public housing may be
developed within a jurisdiction, and requires separate local
authorization for each specific project. 34 The stated purpose of the
cooperation agreement requirement was to obtain local documenta-
tion of the need for low-income housing,35 but, in practice, the
law provides a standardless local veto over federally funded public
housing.
Underlying the cooperation agreement requirement are the
assumptions that public housing must be administered by local
government entities, and that localities should not be forced to
participate in federal housing programs. The practical effect of the
cooperation agreement requirement has been to limit even small-
scale public housing to jurisdictions that affirmatively seek it out.
Thus, the cooperation agreement requirement has furthered
segregation by limiting public housing resources to cities and towns
with large existing low-income populations, and by permitting other
localities to avoid public housing altogether.
B. Allocation of New Housing Funds
The demand for funds by local PHAs has largely driven the
11 Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974).
31 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(e), public housing funding for the local PHA
is barred "unless the governing body of the locality involved has by resolution
approved the application" for funds and has "entered into an agreement with the
PHA providing for the local cooperation required by the secretary.. . ." Related
provisions in the 1974 Act further require notification to local governments of
applications for housing assistance within their borders, even where no local
governmental involvement is otherwise necessary. See 42 U.S.C. § 1439(c).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1437c(e) ("In recognition that there should be a local
determination of the need for low-income housing to meet needs not being
adequatelymet by private enterprise. . ."). HUD's implementing regulations also
define the terms of the cooperation agreement beneficently, to include a
commitment by the municipality to the long-term support of public housing,
including a local property tax exemption and the nondiscriminatory provision of
basic community services. 24 C.F.R. § 941.201(c) (1993).
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allocation of federal housing funds.36 Although HUD has the
discretion to choose among local requests for housing assistance, it
generally has not sought to locate housing in areas where no
proposal has been made. Instead of encouraging the creation of
more centralized statewide or regional entities capable of making
reasonable determinations as to where housing should be built,
Congress and HUD have fostered the development of duplicative
local PHAs at the level of the smallest possible political subdivi-
sion.
Federal and state governments face strong pressures from
housing advocates working on behalf of their clients and constitu-
ents to distribute government-assisted housing in a pattern that can
result in enhanced economic segregation. Thus, urban housing
advocates may press government agencies for more additional low-
income housing assistance, while suburban housing advocates often
seek funding for moderate-income "affordable housing," elderly
housing and mortgage assistance programs designed primarily for
moderate-income families. Federal and state governments have the
responsibility to meet these pressures with a strong desegregation
mandate. Cities should be assisted to retain and attract moderate-
income families, and suburbs should be more strongly encouraged
(or forced) to house low-income families seeking to live in less
poverty concentrated areas.
The Section 8 rental certificate program illustrates this alloca-
tion problem. Section 8 is primarily a tenant-based program that
enables low-income families to obtain housing in private apart-
ments, and arranges for rent to be paid jointly by the tenant and the
government.37 Prior to 1990, many PHAs administering Section 8
36 See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437, 1439 (statutory authority for federal
funding for public housing and § 8). Cf 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1988 & Supp. III
1991) (§ 236 program); 12 U.S.C. § 1701q (Supp. III 1991) (§ 202 program).
17 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Some § 8
certificates are also attached to specific units, as part of the original housing
rehabilitation or construction agreement (these "unit-based" or "project based"
§ 8 certificates are not directly discussed in this Article). Administration of § 8
certificate programs is delegated to local PHAs and governed by regulations set
out at 24 C.F.R. pt. 882 (1993). Governed by 24 C.F.R. pt. 887, the closely
related § 8 "voucher" program is being consolidated with the § 8 certificate
program. See 58 Fed. Reg. 11,292 (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 36,662 (1994).
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programs did not permit certificate holders to move outside the
geographic boundaries of the city or town receiving Section 8
funding. Thus, if a city resident sought to use Section 8 to rent a
suburban apartment, her only option was to apply to the suburban
PHA for a certificate.38 However, such options were limited in
areas where suburban PHAs controlled only a small number of
certificates, or where few suburban PHAs existed.3 9 In contrast,
central city housing authorities had commonly sought and received
thousands of rental certificates.4" A strong city constituency for
rental housing subsidies, along with lucrative administrative fees, 41
provided ample incentive to, apply for additional allocations of
38 See Barbara Sard, The Massachusetts Experience with Targeted Tenant-
Based Rental Assistance for the Homeless: Lessons on Housing Policy for
Socially Disfavored Groups, Part I, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 16, 24 &
n.90 (1993) [hereinafter Sard I]. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a limited
exception to this rule could be found in a few city housing authorities experi-
menting with "interjurisdictional housing mobility programs." See SUBURBAN
ACTION INSTITUTE, HOUSING CHOICE 143-60 (1980). These programs, like the
less formal "swapping" of certificates between city and suburban PHAs, were
dependent upon voluntary cooperation of suburban PHAs, and did not lead to
significant housing mobility for low-income tenants.
" A different kind of allocation problem is presented where certificates are
allocated at a disproportionately high rate to suburban jurisdictions. See Barbara
Sard, The Massachusetts Experience with Targeted Tenant-Based Rental
Assistance for the Homeless: Lessons on Housing Policy for Socially Disfavored
Groups, Part II, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 182, 211 n.129 (1994)
[hereinafter Sard II]. In such a case, where city applicants are disadvantaged by
local preferences, transportation difficulties and the lack of a unified regional
application process, housing opportunities are likewise denied to central city
residents. See discussion infra at notes 44-59 and accompanying text.
40 For example, approximately 7,500 certificates and vouchers are currently
assigned to Connecticut's three largest cities, with approximately 2,700 assigned
to surrounding suburban PHAs. Allocation of federal § 8 certificates is governed
generally by 42 U.S.C. § 1439 and 24 C.F.R. pt. 791 (1993).
41 The PHA administering a § 8 certificate receives a payment for each
certificate at a monthly rate of 8.2% of the "fair market rent" level for the area.
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(q).
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certificates.42 Today, the legacy of these policies is a concentration
of Section 8 certificates in low-income, racially isolated neighbor-
hoods.43
HUD programs that rely on nonprofit housing sponsors suffer
from a similar problem. Many nonprofit housing developers are
located within areas where poor families already live. The strengths
of urban nonprofit developers-their ties to local communities, and
their familiarity with both the local real estate market and the local
zoning approval process-have also tended to make them reluctant
to enter new and potentially hostile territory outside of their well-
defined catchment areas. At the same time, suburban nonprofit
developers often have little incentive to take on costly and
protracted zoning battles necessary to ensure that low-income
housing gets built. Consequently, suburban nonprofit developers
may be tempted to capitulate to local demands for discriminatory
local residency preferences, higher tenant income levels, lower
population densities and other exclusionary devices. Policymakers
must address these built-in tendencies to perpetuate segregated
housing patterns.
From a desegregation standpoint, low-income housing is most
needed in jurisdictions where it is least wanted. But under a
decentralized system of local PHAs operating in small geographic
areas, PHA-based allocation of HUD housing funds within
42 Central city landlords are also part of the constituency for additional § 8
allocations, and to the extent that they are financially dependent on tenant-based
§ 8 subsidies, they form part of the resistance to further regionalization of the
program.
" See Yale Rabin, RedefiningLow-Income Concentration: HUD 's Regressive
Site and Neighborhood Standards, HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE (forthcoming 1994,
manuscript on file with the Journal of Law and Policy) (citing M. LEGER & F.S.
KENNEDY, ABT ASSOCIATES, FINAL COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE
FREESTANDING HOUSING VOUCHER DEMONSTRATION (1990)). The pattern of
concentration of § 8 rental certificates was a central allegation in Giddins v.
HUD, No. 91 Civ. 7181 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 24, 1991) (alleging discriminatory
administration of the § 8 program in Yonkers and Westchester Counties). See
also United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276, 1347, 1373
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181, 1191 (2d Cir. 1987) (cited in Giddins
Compl. 35) (finding that the city's administration of the § 8 program
contributed to concentration of minority families in southwest Yonkers).
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metropolitan regions will likely continue to perpetuate segregation.
C. Local Application and Admissions Policies
As discussed above, HUD deference to local determinations of
need often misallocates new housing funds to geographic areas that
already have substantial concentrations of low-income housing. At
the same time, HUD deference to local PHA application and
admissions procedures can help make suburban-assisted housing
inaccessible to central city residents. The result is a further
geographical mismatch of needs and benefits.
Urban PHAs offer services that are often duplicated by
neighboring PHAs. A typical central city PHA in the Northeast
may be surrounded by multiple local PHAs, each with jurisdiction
over its own geographic area.44 These suburban PHAs are con-
trolled by locally appointed boards and may employ dozens of staff
members. They each administer separate wait-lists, run separate
advertising, and recruit new tenants at their convenience. In
essence, PHAs are the gatekeepers, to whom Congress has
delegated the power to decide which poor families will live in each
town.
45
Local residency preferences, administered by suburban
44 The pattern described is prevalent in a number of northeastern states,
including Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York and New Jersey. Massachusetts
alone has over 300 local housing authorities, 125 of which operate a § 8
program. Sard II, supra note 39, at 211 n. 129. In some states, like New York or
Maryland, suburban § 8 programs are also divided along city-suburban lines, but
often with a countywide PHA running the suburban program. See, e.g., Comer
v. Kemp, 824 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D.N.Y.), vacated in part, aff'd in part, Nos. 93-
6207, 93-6253, 93-6333 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 1994).
4' This delegation of control was not inadvertent. As the Senate committee
observed, in proposing the § 8 program in 1974, "[tlhe committee is firmly
convinced that primary responsibility for carrying out [the program] should be
vested in public housing agencies." The committee expressed its "strong desire
that as much decision making as possible be done on the local, as opposed to
federal, level" and warned that "regulations abrogating the local decision making
power" would be viewed with "strong disfavor." S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4273, 4314.
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PHAs," have been challenged as one of the more obvious
mechanisms of suburban housing segregation.47 Any policy that
gives preference in admission to town residents effectively excludes
equally qualified out-of-town residents, particularly where the
number of qualified local applicants exceeds the number of
available apartments.48 Where there is a significant difference
46 Residency preferences (which give priority in admission to applicants
living or working in the PHA's jurisdiction) are generally permitted in federal
housing programs, although they are usually subordinate to certain federally-
required preferences. See infra note 48. Residency "requirements" and durational
residency preferences are prohibited. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 882.517(e) (1993)
(§ 8). Local residency preferences are required to be consistent with fair housing
requirements, although until recently, HUD approval was not required before a
PHA could implement local residency preferences, see, e.g., 24 C.F.R.
§ 882.219(b)(4) (1993) (§ 8), and this author is unaware of any instance of HUD
disapproval of a residency preference outside the context of a civil rights
complaint. In 1994, the federal admissions regulations were amended to require
HUD preapproval of residency preferences and to more explicitly require
conformancewith fair housing requirements. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.208, in 59 Fed.
Reg. 36,662, 36,687 (1994); see also 59 Fed. Reg. 36,616 (1994). However, as
HUD acknowledges, the new rule suffers from a "lack of stated criteria to be
used for disapproving residency preferences," 59 Fed. Reg. at 36,619, and
accordingly, HUD has initiated separate rule making to develop more specific
procedures and criteria to assess the impact of residency preferences. Id.
47 In Secretary v. Melrose Housing Authority, No. HUDALJ 01-92-0175-1
(HUD 1993), for example, a HUD administrative law judge found reasonable
cause that a suburban residency preference discriminates and perpetuates
segregation based on race, where the town's population was 97% White, and
where a significant discrepancy existed between the percentage of minority
families in the § 8 program and the percentage of minority families on the wait-
list. A similar federal case, Comer v. Kemp, challenges, in part, the
discriminatory effect of suburban residency preferences on low-income minority
tenants in the Buffalo area.
" The most extreme effects of local residency preferences may have been
tempered, at least within the § 8 program, by the requirement of "federal
preferences," which require PHAs to give priority to the most needy applicants,
including families who are involuntarily displaced, families who are homeless or
living in substandard housing and families paying more than 50% of their income
for rent. 24 C.F.R. § 882.517 (1993). Depending on the geographic area, these
rules can give some countervailing priority to central city residents who apply
to suburban programs, although HUD permits local PHAs to give priority to
local residents within the federal preference system (giving priority, for example,
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between the racial makeup of the PHA's town and the housing
market as a whole, residency preferences have a discriminatory
impact on minority applicants and perpetuate segregation, in
violation of the Fair Housing Act.49 HUD approval of such
policies also violates the agency's duty to affirmatively further fair
housing under the Act.5 °
The effect of discretion vested by HUD in small suburban
PHAs over day-to-day admissions procedures, although less obvious
than the effect of explicit residency policies, may be just as
important to the pattern of metropolitan segregation. Whether
intentionally or unknowingly, local administrators can build a
pattern of segregation cumulatively over time with a series of small
and seemingly benign acts. For example, in the administration of
the Section 8 program, local PHA staff members may exercise
discretion in making upward adjustments to allowable rent
payments,5 extending the initial certificate period during a
family's housing search,52 and determining and weighing an
applicant's federal preference status.53 Each of these discretionary
actions, if exercised in favor of a local resident, can have a
to a suburban resident in substandard housing over a nonresident in substandard
housing). The federal preferences have been weakened by recent statutory and
regulatory amendments that permit local PHAs to disregard federal preferences
for a significant percentage of units outside the § 8 certificate program (50% of
public housing units, 30% of § 8 moderate rehabilitation units, etc.). See 59 Fed.
Reg. 36,616 (1994).
49 See Melrose Hous. Auth., No. HUDALJ 01-92-0175-1; cf In re Township
of Warren, 622 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1993). See generally Roisman & Tegeler, supra
note 14, at 315-25 (discriminatory impact).
50 Surprisingly, until recently, local residency preferences had been routinely
approved by HUD, even for predominantly White towns in highly integrated
housing markets. Although HUD's pending rule making, see 59 Fed. Reg. at
36,619, and its recent administrative decision in Secretary v. Melrose Housing
Authority, No. HUDALJ 01-92-0175-1, may signal a new willingness on the part
of the agency to reexamine the discriminatory effects of local residency
preferences, HUD has not yet proposed any general elimination of the use of
residency preferences by local PHAs and has actually continued to defend
residency preferences (through the Department of Justice) in the Comer case.
51 24 C.F.R. § 882.106(a)(2) (1993).
12 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(d) (1993).
13 24 C.F.R. § 882.219(b)(2)(iii) (1993).
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discriminatory effect. Likewise, even the most scrupulous of local
PHAs are not immune from referrals from local politicians or
landlords and similar acts of rule bending that may benefit local
residents. Other local practices may include frequent purging of
names from wait-lists without adjusting for the high rate of
mobility of central city applicants, and requiring applicants to
personally appear at the PHA office to pick up or fill out applica-
tions. Failure by suburban PHAs to engage in affirmative
marketing to attract out-of-town applicants55 and differential
treatment by PHA staff in the degree of housing search assistance
offered to individual applicants56 may also contribute to further
segregation.57 Indeed, the very existence of multiple separate
housing authorities, with separate physical locations, wait-lists and
admissions procedures, is increasingly recognized as a
discriminatory barrier to access to housing benefits for low-income
minority families.
Differential treatment of out-of-town minority families may be
very difficult to detect without testing. In fact, such disparate
treatment may not even be consciously "noticed" by the suburban
Section 8 administrator. Yet, over time, a recognizable pattern may
evolve: a predominantly White group of certificate holders
alongside a predominantly minority wait-list, in a low-income
14 In recognition of this problem, particularly as it affects persons with
disabilities, the HUD regional director for Region I recently suggested that local
PHAs in Massachusetts mail applications to prospective tenants.
11 HUD, PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCY ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES HANDBOOK
FOR THE SECTION 8 ExISTING HOUSING PROGRAM, No. 7420.7, ch. 9 (1983).
56 24 C.F.R. § 882.103(a) (1993).
" Barbara Sard describes a number of these "bureaucratic obstacles" in the
context of access to housing by "socially disfavored groups" (such as the
homeless) in Massachusetts. Sard II, supra note 39, at 192-93. Sard also
identifies practices such as closing of wait-lists, limiting of time periods for
accepting new applications, violation of federal preference rules, unlawful use of
"tenant suitability" factors in screening, and informal telephone practices used to
discourage applications. Sard II, supra note 39, at 192-93.
58 Fair housing testing involves a staged housing search, usually under the
supervision of an attorney or fair housing agency, by one or more persons posing
as potential renters or home buyers to collect evidence and determine whether




housing market that is largely Black and Latino. In the context of
multiple local PHAs, with differing political allegiances and social
agendas, HUD's traditional reliance on the threat of Title VIII or
Title VI investigation and enforcement 9 will continue to be an
ineffective means of promoting housing choice and racial integra-
tion on a large scale.
D. Site Selection
HUD's "site and neighborhood" regulations,6" which govern
location of public and assisted housing projects, also demonstrate
the segregative effects of a highly localized federal housing policy.
The regulations, originally adopted in response to the 1970 decision
in Shannon v. HUD,61 essentially require that new assisted
housing be located outside of "area[s] of minority concentra-
tion."62 Ironically, however, HUD has in the past interpreted these
'9 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars "discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1988). HUD procedures for receipt and investigation of complaints under Title
VI are set out at 24 C.F.R. § 1.1 - 1.12 (1993). HUD procedures for Title VIII
complaints are set out at 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1988).
61 See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c) (1993) (public housing development);
24 C.F.R. § 880.206(c) (1993) (§ 8 new construction). Each HUD multifamily
program includes site selection regulations.
6 1 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970). In Shannon, the Third Circuit required HUD
to adopt procedures to evaluate the racial impact of new housing sites, in light
of HUD's obligation to affirmatively further fair housing. HUD's first site
selection regulations followed two years later. A helpful history of the site and
neighborhood regulations is set out in Michael Vernarelli, Where Should HUD
Locate Assisted Housing? in HOUSING DESEGREGATION AND FEDERAL POLICY
(John M. Goering ed., 1986).
62 According to 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(c)(1) (1993):
[t]he site for new construction projects must not be located in ... [a]n
area of minority concentration unless (i) sufficient, comparable
opportunities exist for housing for minority families, in the income
range to be served by the proposed project, outside areas of minority
concentration, or (ii) the project is necessary to meet overriding
housing needs which cannot otherwise feasibly be met in that housing
market area.
Accord24 C.F.R.§ 880.206(c) (1993) (§ 8 new construction); seealso 24 C.F.R.
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regulations so leniently, that in many instances, local PHAs have
been permitted to locate a significant portion of assisted housing in
racially concentrated neighborhoods.63 Prior to 1993, HUD's
approach to determining whether a neighborhood was "minority
concentrated" was simply to compare the racial makeup of the
neighborhood (usually a census tract) with the racial makeup of the
PHAs area of jurisdiction. Thus, if the neighborhood had a higher
minority population percentage than the PHA's area, HUD defined
the neighborhood as an area of minority concentration. 64 But
because few central city PHAs have been given permission to
operate in the suburbs, the "jurisdiction" of the PHA is often
limited to the boundaries of the city.
Predictably, HUD's approach tended to create a higher percent
definition of minority concentration than a regionally-based
definition, particularly in cities that are racially separate from their
suburbs.65 This approach permitted low-income housing to be
§ 941.202(c)(2) ("racially mixed" areas). For public housing development not
involving new construction, the regulations require that the location chosen must
"further. . . compliance" with Title VIII. 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(b) (1993). The
site and neighborhood standards also require that potential housing sites "must
promote a greater choice of housing opportunities by avoiding areas that contain
(or would contain if the housing were approved for assistance) an undue
concentration of poverty-level population, as determined under 24 CFR part
770." 24 C.F.R. § 941.202(d) (1993); see also 24 C.F.R. pt. 770 (1993).
63 A full attempt to explain the failure of the site and neighborhood
standards is beyond the scope of this Article. Among the reasons are the city-
based definition of minority concentration, discussed above; the failure to place
any new units outside of the area of PHA jurisdiction; the deference accorded to
local PHAs to decide what constitutes a neighborhood for purposes of the
standards; the overly broad and unenforceable standards for housing developed
through rehabilitation or acquisition; and the prior interpretation of 24 C.F.R.
§ 941.202(c) (and similar standards) by HUD to permit one-half of the proposed
units in an allocation to be located inside areas of minority concentration. See
Rabin, supra note 43.
64 This policy was formalized in HUD NOTICE No. H-81-2 (1981). Prior to
1981, HUD had sometimes used a uniform 40% figure to measure minority
concentration, which had a similar segregative effect. The uniform approach was
submitted as a proposed regulation during the Carter administration, but never
adopted. See Vernarelli, supra, note 61.




located in neighborhoods with significant minority populations, and
also contributed to racial segregation by making central cities more
racially concentrated in relation to the suburbs with each new
housing unit.66 HUD's prior site selection policies have led to calls
for a regionally-based approach to defining "areas of minority
,,67concentration.
E. Section 8 Portability Administration
In 1987, Congress made a potentially far-reaching change to the
Section 8 rental certificate program by guaranteeing all certificate
holders the right to move across local boundaries to rent apart-
ments. 68 The 1987 legislation 69 provided families receiving
Section 8 certificates with the right to use their rental certificates
in any town in their region, as long as the private apartments they
wished to rent were below the federally established fair market rent
level.70 Congress later expanded the statute to permit statewide
66 This policy has also led to a predictable inconsistency among cities. For
example, an area of minority concentration in Providence, Rhode Island was
defined as 21.5%, based on 1980 citywide data, in Project B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp,
776 F. Supp. 637, 641 (D.R.I. 1991); in Bridgeport, Connecticut, the citywide
percent minority is 50%; in Baltimore, Maryland, 60%. See RUSK, supra note 5,
at 77. The definition of minority concentration may also shift from decade to
decade, because it is based on U.S. Census data. For example, a census tract that
was "minority concentrated" under the 1980 census may no longer be concentrat-
ed in 1990, if the citywide growth in minority population outpaced the growth
in that tract.
67 See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 43 (proposing that the metropolitan area
should be recognized as the relevant housing market for purposes of calculating
existing neighborhood concentrations by income and race).
6 Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-242,
§ 145, 101 Stat. 1877 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)). The statute provided
that § 8 recipients could move to eligible units within the same, or contiguous
"metropolitan statistical area" as the PHA issuing the certificate.
69 The implementation of the 1987 amendment was delayed at least three
years by HUD's failure to notify local PHAs of their obligations, until forced by
litigation and threatened litigation. See, e.g., Smith v. HUD, No. 89-0612L
(D.R.I., Consent Decree filed Jan. 19, 1990).
70 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(1).
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housing choice for Section 8 families.7' On its face, the 1987
amendment appeared to be a direct effort to accomplish one
original legislative purpose of the Section 8 program: to promote
regional housing opportunities.72
However, in specifying the administrative arrangements that
would govern the new "portability" rule, Congress continued its
deference to local government prerogatives by requiring that
administration of the Section 8 certificate be transferred to the PHA
in the town to which the family moves.73 The complicated
resulting administrative arrangements, which HUD later enumerated
in detail,74 create serious disincentives for central city PHAs to
7' Pub. L. No. 101-625, § 551, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990). The statute was
subsequently amended in 1992 to require a one-year waiting period for
nonresidents prior to moving out of the issuing jurisdiction. Pub. L. No. 102-550,
§ 147, 106 Stat. 3672 (1992).
72 The § 8 certificate program is authorized "[flor the purpose of aiding low-
income families in obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting
economicallymixed housing. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a); see also Pub. L. No. 93-
383, 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (the Housing and Community Development Act of
1974), which includes the congressional finding that "the concentration of
persons of lower income in central cities" is a significant contributing factor to
"critical social, economic, and environmental problems" in the nation's cities,
§ 101(a)(1), and lists as a specific objective of the Act "the reduction of the
isolation of income groups within communities and geographical areas and the
promotion of an increase in the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods through
the spatial deconcentration of housing opportunities for persons of lower income
." § 101(c)(6).
" According to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(r)(2) (1993):
[t]he public housing agency having authority with respect to the
dwelling unit to which a family moves under this subsection shall have
the responsibility of carrying out the provisions of this subsection with
respect to the family. If no public housing agency has authority with
respect to the dwelling unit to which a family moves under this
subsection, the public housing agency approving the assistance shall
have such responsibility.
If the sending PHA has authority to administer certificates in the receiving town,
no transfer of administration is required.
71 In implementing the new rule, HUD required local PHAs to follow
preexisting regulations for program administration and fee sharing. These
regulations require central city PHAs to transfer the administration of city rental
certificates to suburban PHAs, including transfer of 80% of the lucrative § 8
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aggressively pursue regional mobility75 and subject families on the
program to the unnecessary additional obstacle of dealing with two
PHA bureaucracies if they wish to move.
II. CHANGING THE GROUND RULES
As HUD moves forward with a challenging housing integration
agenda, it should at least attempt to avoid the obstacles to integra-
tion that are built into its tradition of deference to local agencies
and local decision-making. HUD can accomplish this by adopting
housing desegregation policies that (1) do not require suburban
government participation; (2) deemphasize new housing construc-
tion; and (3) increase the use of regional entities to implement
desegregation goals.
A. Housing Integration Programs Should Avoid Suburban
Government Participation
HUD's reliance on local housing authorities, as demonstrated in
the programs previously discussed, often contributes to segregation.
Although the federal government has traditionally favored placing
direct responsibility in local PHAs, this deference can and should
be abrogated when reliance on local programs conflicts with fair
housing goals.76 At the very least, HUD should sharply curtail the
administrative fee for every city certificate used in a suburb where another PHA
has jurisdiction. See HUD NOTICE No. 90-43 (1990), replaced by HUD NOTICE
No. 91-19 (1991), referencing 24 C.F.R. pt. 887 (1993). HUD has also issued
proposed regulations governing portability. 58 Fed. Reg. 11,292 (1993).
" As Alexander Polikoff, among others, has observed, this system of shared
administration and forfeiting of lucrative administrative fees "creates a 'vested
interest' in housing authorities to retain participating families within their
jurisdictions and thereby realize the administrative fees the certificates or
vouchers represent." POLIKOFF, supra note 4, at n.51.
76 According to 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1990), it is "the policy of the United
States ... consistent with the objectives of this chapter," to vest responsibility
in local public housing agencies. Thus, where delegation to local PHAs clearly
conflicts with other purposes or findings of the U.S. Housing Act or the Fair
Housing Act, it becomes HUD's obligation to abrogate local authority. See 42
U.S.C. § 3601 (policy of the United States to provide "for fair housing
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initial "decision-making" functions of PHAs, including decisions
about how much additional housing is needed in a municipality,
where it should be located and who should live there. A more
appropriate role for local PHAs could be the administration of
programs and tenants that are already in place."
The Gautreaux housing mobility program in Chicago, which
places low-income families throughout the region, has been highly
successful, in part because it does not involve suburban PHAs in
decisions about which families and how many families may live in
suburban towns.78 It should be possible to duplicate the regional
throughout the United States"); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (purpose of § 8 program
includes "promoting economicallymixed housing"); see also Pub. L. No. 93-383,
§§ 101(a)(1), 101(c)(6), 88 Stat. 633 (1974) (purpose of Housing and
Community Development Act includes "spatial deconcentration of housing
opportunities for persons of lower income.").
77 Local housing authorities undoubtedly perform many functions superla-
tively. But some of the strengths of local PHAs-their understanding of "local
needs," their grounding in the local political structure, their close contacts with
local landlords, and their accountability to local voters, make PHAs less than
suitable vehicles to accomplish housing integration.
71 Under the Gautreaux program, the Leadership Council for Metropolitan
Open Communities, operating as a regional PHA, places families directly with
suburban landlords, and then generally transfers administration of a family's § 8
certificate to the local PHA, if one exists. The Gautreaux program's regional
mandate arises out of the original Gautreaux court decision. After HUD and the
Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA") were found liable for housing discrimina-
tion, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that, because of the high
concentration of low-income and minority families in Chicago, "a city-only
remedy will not work." Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 292 (1976) (quoting
503 F.2d at 936-37). The Supreme Court also upheld the Seventh Circuit's
recommendation of a regional remedy, despite the absence of suburban
municipalities and PHAs as defendants. Id. at 297. Distinguishing Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the Court reasoned that a metropolitan order "will
not necessarily entail coercion of uninvolved governmental units, because CHA
and HUD have the authority to operate outside the Chicago city limits," and that
local government involvement is not necessary for HUD administration of the
§ 8 program. 425 U.S. at 298. Similarly, in NAACP v. Kemp, 721 F. Supp. 361,
368 (D. Mass. 1989), the federal district court in Massachusetts interpreted Hills
v. Gautreaux as authorizing suburban relief based on HUD liability, without
suburban government participation in the lawsuit. The consent decree in NAACP
v. Kemp included, inter alia, an allocation of portable § 8 certificates earmarked
for suburban use, and a regional clearinghouse for suburban rental listings.
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scope of the Gautreaux program without bringing additional federal
lawsuits. For example, as an alternative to traditional administration
of the Section 8 program, HUD could begin to administer new
housing mobility programs directly79 or through regional nonprofit
agencies.8 0 This approach has the added advantage of avoiding state
laws that bar housing development by PHAs across town lines.
Similarly, HUD could increase its reliance on state housing
agencies" to administer programs directly in suburban jurisdic-
tions.82  As HUD moves forward with second generation
Gautreaux programs such as the new "Choice in Residency"
proposal, 3 it should give serious consideration to administering
these programs outside the existing local PHA structure. 4
" Direct HUD administration of § 8 programs is authorized by 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(b), and by 24 C.F.R. § 882.121 (1993) if no PHA is "able and willing"
to administer a particular allocation of certificates.
8o PHAs eligible to operate § 8 programs may include "[a]ny state, county,
municipality or other governmental entity or public body (or agency or
instrumentality thereof)." 24 C.F.R. § 882.102 (1993).
1I HUD's definition of PHAs eligible to receive allocations of certificates
includes state agencies, 24 C.F.R. § 882.102 (1993), and state agencies have been
used successfully to administer § 8 programs. See Sard II, supra note 39, at 192;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27C-24 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); see also Housing
Auth. v. Papandrea, 610 A.2d 637 (Conn. 1992).
2 Barbara Sard's experience in Massachusetts is strongly supportive of this
approach. See Sard II, supra note 39, at 191 ("[T]he potential of tenant-based
rental assistance programs to better serve members of socially disfavored groups
is undercut when the programs are administered by local housing authorities,
rather than by regional agencies under the supervision of the state housing
agency."). See also Rabin, supra note 43.
83 The ambitious "Choice in Residency" program proposed in President
Clinton's 1995 budget would allocate an additional 45,000 low-income rental
housing certificates and $149 million in housing counselling grants to help up to
300,000 families "living in areas with high concentrations of poverty or racial
separation have a real opportunity to move to other neighborhoods." HUD FY
1995 BUDGET, supra note 6, at 17. In light of the principles discussed above, the
new program's prospects for success may in part depend on what types of
entities are selected to administer the program, and whether the certificates used
are specially earmarked for regional use, without the usual administration and fee
sharing that plagues the current program.
4 The legislation initially submitted to Congress by HUD in 1994 is
promising in this regard. See Housing Choice and Community Investment Act
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A related approach could involve the transformation of every
Section 8 tenant-based certificate program into a regional housing
mobility program.85 Such a proposal might require every central
city PHA to provide a basic package of regional mobility
services, 6 with HUD encouraging central city PHAs to assist
families seeking to move to suburban towns. In particular, HUD
could counter current disincentives to regional mobility by
providing financial incentives to PHAs that assist tenants in
integrative moves.87
B. Housing Integration Programs Should Avoid New
Construction
New low-income housing construction is undoubtedly a crucial
element in any government housing strategy, particularly in
metropolitan areas with severe shortages of low cost housing.
However, despite its merits in expanding the overall supply of low-
income housing, new construction may be the least effective
approach to achieving significant housing desegregation. New
construction is too slow, too dependent on suburban government
of 1994, H.R. 4310, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 411 (1994) (nonprofit organizations
eligible for Choice in Residency grants).
85 See POLIKOFF, supra note 4, at 16; Roisman & Botein, supra note 4, at
350-51.
86 See Roisman & Botein, supra note 4, at 339-44. Mobility plans, like one
adopted in Hartford, Connecticut in 1990, can include, at a minimum, multiple
written and oral notification to clients of their mobility rights, regular collection
and posting of suburban rental listings, dissemination of information about
suburban transportation and services, outreach to suburban landlords and referral
of discrimination complaints. See Roisman & Botein, supra note 4, at 339-44.
87 HUD already possesses funding authority to assist central city PHAs in
this regard. "The Secretary may increase the fee if necessary to reflect the higher
costs of administering.., programs operating over large geographic areas," and
authorize additional payments to PHAs for "the costs incurred in assisting
families who experience difficulty (as determined by the Secretary) in obtaining
appropriate housing." 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(q)(1). Furthermore, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(r)(3) addresses the fear some PHAs may have about loss of certificates,
by explicitly requiring HUD to give "consideration to any reduction in the
number of resident families incurred by a public housing agency in the preceding
fiscal year" in determining new allocations of § 8 certificates.
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cooperation and, although it can generate landmark lawsuits,"8
new construction is unlikely to produce a sufficient number of units
for desegregation purposes.89
Proposing new construction in a suburban town is ineffective as
a housing integration strategy because it guarantees suburban
government involvement in the decision-making process. Although
most towns no longer explicitly exclude multifamily housing in
local zoning ordinances, local zoning approval is usually required
for any change in housing density, and local governments possess
a wide variety of discretionary bases for disapproving such housing.
For these reasons, regional housing desegregation efforts will
continue to rely heavily on the use of rental certificates for the
majority of integrative moves.9
Another promising housing integration strategy would rely on
acquisition and rehabilitation of existing housing in suburban
communities, which generally require no zoning or other land use
permits. Housing acquisition is a valuable and underutilized method
of expanding low-income housing opportunities in predominantly
White, middle class communities. Existing housing acquisition and
integration programs have focused on one- and two-family homes,
88 For example, the case of Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff'dper curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988), was
an extremely important exclusionary zoning precedent in the Second Circuit, but
has not yet created any units of housing, primarily because of the extensive
delays caused by the litigation. In Connecticut, the two major exclusionary
zoning lawsuits decided since 1988 in the Connecticut Supreme Court, both
involving new housing, will directly result in no more than 11 units of housing.
See West Hartford Interfaith Coalition v. Town Council, 636 A.2d 1342 (Conn.
1994); Builders Serv. Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 545 A.2d 530
(Conn. 1988).
89 This is particularly true in an era when low-income housing is being
increasingly developed on a scattered site basis, and every small development has
the potential to generate an expensive zoning battle and years of litigation. See,
e.g., West Hartford Interfaith Coalition, 636 A.2d at 1342.
'0 See also Sard II, supra note 39, at 196 (tenant-based assistance gives
greater access to homeless families); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 1, at 231.
In the Hartford area, for example, although few low-income suburban units have
been created through new construction since 1990, almost 400 city families with
§ 8 rental certificates have moved to suburban towns under the city's regional
housing mobility program.
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condominiums and even small apartment buildings.9' HUD should
adapt its rules to permit more frequent use of this strategy.92
C. State and Federal Housing Programs Must Be Regionalized
Planning for the location of housing, projecting housing need,
and identifying families most in need, all should occur on a
regional basis. In contrast, housing programs that are divided up on
a town-by-town basis are destined to misallocate resources. There
is no requirement, however, that the "Public Housing Agencies"
that HUD contracts with will be limited to PHAs in specific towns.
In fact, ample precedent already exists for regional entities, such as
regional nonprofit agencies, to administer HUD programs.93 HUD
should take steps to affirmatively encourage the development of
such entities in areas where they do not exist,94 and give regional
agencies priority in future funding awards.95
By promoting and delegating housing responsibility to regional
PHAs or nonprofit agencies, HUD would consolidate duplicative
program functions, which are now handled inefficiently by separate
staff at multiple local PHAs. Enforcement would also be
"' See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp. 1577, 1582
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (housing remedy order authorizing "purchase and/or lease...
of available units in existing private condominiums, co-operatives or rental
buildings throughout Yonkers"); Roisman & Botein, supra note 4, at 348 (single
family homes in New Haven, Connecticut and Cleveland, Ohio).
92 The major danger in such a strategy is the risk of involuntary displace-
ment of low-income existing suburban residents from marginal multifamily
properties. To avoid such displacement, safeguards (such as noneviction
requirements or priority to vacant, abandoned or commercial property) need to
be in place before a large scale acquisition strategy is attempted.
9' See Sard II, supra note 39, at 192.
94 For example, if the proposed "Choice in Residency" program is funded
by Congress, HUD should consider using the program as a vehicle to create new
regional organizations to compete with local PHAs for the administration of § 8
certificates. Cf 58 Fed. Reg. 68,000 (1993) (Fair Housing Initiatives Program
announcement, encouraging creation of new fair housing organizations in under-
served areas).
" See also RUSK, supra note 5, at 85-102 (advocating development of
regional government structures through city-county consolidation, direct
annexation and other methods).
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streamlined, with potential regionwide remedies imposed against
entities with regional jurisdiction and operations.96
HUD has already unveiled one such regionalization proposal, at
the 1994 HUD Fair Housing Summit-a Metropolitan Areawide
Fair Housing Strategy.97 This proposal was described in President
Clinton's 1994 memorandum accompanying the new executive
order on fair housing,9" to include "a one-stop, metropolitan
areawide fair housing opportunity pilot program that will
effectively offer Federally assisted housing, Federally insured
housing, and private market housing within a metropolitan area to
all residents of the area." 99 It remains unclear, however, what the
program's relationship with local PHAs and other assisted housing
providers in a region would be. For the reasons discussed earlier,
if the pilot program requires voluntary cooperation from suburban
PHAs, it is unlikely to achieve its potential.'0 0
96 See, e.g., Giddins v. HUD, No. 91 Civ. 7181 (S.D.N.Y., Consent Decree
dated Aug., 1993) (countywide § 8 mobility program ordered in lawsuit against
HUD, state housing agency, local PHA, and countywide § 8 administrator).
97 See HUD, THE NATIONAL FAIR HOUSING SUMMIIT: FINAL REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS W-62 (1994).
98 59 Fed. Reg. 8513 (1994).
99 Id. at 8514. This directive was also reflected in President Clinton's
proposed 1995 budget, which included $24 million for the program. HUD FY
1995 BUDGET, supra note 6, at 18. The pilot program is apparently designed to
address the important problem of exclusion of out-of-town residents that is built
in to any housing program with multiple sites, separate waiting lists and separate
administrative staffs scattered throughout the metropolitan area. An unofficial
description of the areawide strategy proposed placing all housing applicants on
"all waiting lists for all assisted housing programs" in the region, and listing all
housing openings in a central regional clearinghouse. HUD, THE NATIONAL FAIR
HOUSING SUMMIT: FINAL REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS (1994). It is also promising
that, in the original proposal, HUD plans to rely on private nonprofit organiza-
tions, rather than existing PHAs, to "coordinate the region's tenant selection,
assignment, and counseling services." HUD FY 1995 BUDGET, supra note 6, at
18.
10' The initial demonstration version of the metropolitanwide waiting list
proposal suffered from this very flaw. See Housing Choice and Community
Investment Act of 1994, H.R. 4310, § 601 ("Metropolitan Areawide Strategy
Demonstration" is a three-city demonstration to be funded in regions where "a
sufficient number of units of general local government, public housing agencies,
and private owners of assisted housing are committed to participate.").
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CONCLUSION
The federal government should reexamine its tradition of
delegating responsibility and deferring to local housing authorities,
in light of the current system's tendency to promote segregation.
By permitting suburban government involvement in decisions
affecting the location and occupancy of low-income housing, HUD
risks the exclusion of new housing and invites adoption of
preferences and practices that may exclude families with the
greatest need. By limiting or regionalizing local PHA "gatekeeping"
functions and by expanding the use of other public and private
entities to achieve its fair housing goals, HUD may be able to
maintain its preference for local administration while at the same
time enhancing prospects for regional desegregation.
